RESEARCH STATEMENT
ARTURS LOGINS, PhD

I specialize in epistemology and in foundational normative questions, but I am also interested in philosophy of language. I have focused my research on three main questions: What are normative reasons in general? How do we think about graded notions in epistemology? What are the consequences within and outside epistemology of taking knowledge as fundamental and explanatorily prime? These general research questions correspond to my three main research programs.

Normative reasons

It is both natural and very common to think that epistemic reasons are just a subcategory of normative reasons. However, this leads to the fundamental question: What exactly are normative reasons? This question is at the heart of my first major research program. The work on this has already produced two publications: an article published in *Thought*, and another one published in *Ethics*. According to my account normative reasons are appropriate answers to the normative question 'Why one should F (why one should do the relevant thing/hold the relevant attitude)?'. Moreover, normative reasons come in two varieties: normative reasoning reasons and normative explanation reasons. These two sorts of reasons correspond to two distinct possible readings of the normative Why-F-questions, the reading on which the question asks for a premise in an argument/pattern of reasoning towards the conclusion that one should do the relevant thing or hold the relevant attitude and the reading on which the question asks for an explanation of the fact that one should do the relevant thing or hold the relevant attitude. I develop this theory further as well as assess existing alternative views in a book manuscript that is currently under review with Cambridge University Press.

Gradability in epistemology

Most theorists agree that epistemic justification (or rationality) comes in degrees and yet most of the theories of epistemic justification are theories of categorical justification. A number of contemporary assumptions about justification stand in tension with the idea that justification comes in degrees, for instance the assumption that to be justified to believe that p just is to be permitted to believe that p. Relatedly, the relation between graded belief, or credence and categorical belief is still not fully understood. While there is a vast literature on this topic, deep disagreements about the exact nature of the relationship, if any, are still persistent in epistemology and philosophy of mind, as exemplified by the ongoing debates on credence-belief dualism and the Lottery Paradox, a problem for the probabilistic approaches to degrees of belief.

I plan to continue my investigation of gradable notions in epistemology, including justification, rationality, degrees of belief, confidence, doubt, evidential support, and confirmation. My currently research in this domain is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation Ambizione Fellowship project on graded epistemology. My work has already produced results. In an article published in *Philosophical Studies* I develop a new solution to the Lottery Paradox and investigate the graded sense of 'is confident'. In another article, published in *Erkenntnis* I apply the insights from linguistics of gradable adjectives to the long-standing disagreement between Bayesians and Peter Achinstein over the nature of evidential support. Finally, in a

recent article published in *Philosophical Studies* and co-authored with John Hawthorne (USC/ACU), we explore the graded sense of 'is justified'. We suggest that it fits poorly with simple probabilistic accounts of justification, and we conclude tentatively that the graded use of 'is justified' is scale-derivative and not essential to understanding of justification.

Knowledge-first program in and beyond epistemology

Most of the efforts in (analytic) epistemology of the second half of the twentieth century were devoted to searching for ways to define knowledge that would avoid the famous Gettier counterexamples (e.g. Gettier 1963). However, with a growing number of unsuccessful attempts in finding such a definition, another approach in epistemology became popular at the beginning of the twenty-first century, specifically the knowledge-first approach proposed by Timothy Williamson (e.g. Williamson 2000). According to this approach knowledge is undefinable and should be thought of as a prime element in explaining other epistemically significant properties and states. That is the knowledge-first approach urges us to rethink the whole debate and instead of trying to define knowledge appeal to it in theorizing about other notions. Such an approach promises to offer a new perspective on a number of traditional debates such as debates about skepticism, justification, evidence, and assertion just to name few.

My Ph.D. thesis explored the knowledge-first theory that the evidence that one has consists of all and only propositions that one knows. The following articles grew out of this work. A 2017 paper, published in *Theoria*, revisited overlooked arguments from language use and common sense judgments about the importance of knowledge for possession of reasons and applied these to the case of having evidence. A paper published in *Logos & Episteme* replies to an argument that evidence need not be propositional. And an article published in *Logique & Analyse* questions the grounds of another argument in favor of propositionalism about evidence. Another paper challenging the knowledge view of evidence on the basis of the tension between probabilism about evidential support and the possibility of knowledge of necessary truths won the *Philosophy South* prize in 2016 from the Brazilian review *Unisinos Journal of Philosophy*.

Currently, I am working on two articles on the role of knowledge outside epistemology. The first is on the role of knowledge in causal action explanation for which I have received a "revise and submit" decision from European Journal of Philosophy. The second is on the role of knowledge in making emotions reasonable, and I will be submitting it to another top generalist journal soon.

I am also working on a book on knowledge and evidence. It will contain some of my published works, as well as investigate and resolve the most notable problem for any externalist approach in epistemology, the New Evil Demon problem, applied to the knowledge view of evidence; the problem of how to make sense of the knowledge view of evidence given the possibility of radical deception scenarios where the evidence that a victim of radical deception possesses appears to be indistinguishable from the evidence that her internally identic but non-deceived doppelgänger has.