

Reasons still answer questions: A reply to Rotkale

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Abstract. This paper is a response to the recent objection from Līva Rotkale to the Erotetic theory of reasons from Logins 2022. I explore several lines of resistance that a proponent of the Erotetic view can propose.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper aims to respond to recent insightful criticism by Līva Rotkale to the question-based theory of reasons. The question-based – the Erotetic view – of reasons is the theory defended recently in (Logins 2022). However, other researchers have also expressed sympathy for theorizing about reasons from a question-based perspective (cf. Hieronymi 2005).

More specifically, I will explore the objections to some of the cases proposed in (Logins 2022) as illustrations of the view. I will also provide an answer to each of these attempts to revisit the cases. My conclusion is that the Erotetic theory of reasons still stands. In what follows, I first briefly present the tenets of the Erotetic view, its core theses, and the motivation for them. I then introduce objections and respond to these accordingly.

2. THE CORE THESES OF THE EROTETIC VIEW AND MOTIVATION

According to my version of the question-centered view, reasons are, roughly, answers to questions. More concretely, normative reasons are appropriate answers to normative questions of a specific sort. They are answers to questions, understood as abstract objects of the same sort as

propositions. They are answers to the questions that ask why to do something, why believe something, why have a given attitude, or why one ought/should do something, and so on. The core thesis of the Erotetic view is thus summed up on the following simple definition (Definition 1):

The Erotetic View of Reasons: For that p to be a reason to F for S is for that p to be (a part of) the content of an appropriate answer to a (S directed) question ‘Why F?’. (Logins 2022, 168)

A key motivation here is an observation that questions are central to rational agents who try to make their way in a complex world. When we ask ourselves what to do, what to believe, and so on, we look for elements that can close these questions. Questioning what to do and what attitudes to have is central to rational agency. Having the answers to these questions amounts to effectively closing the relevant questions, at least for a while. We have found considerations that speak in favor or against one way or another of acting; we have found considerations that speak in favor or against a belief or some other attitude. These considerations play the role of closing the relevant questions for us. It is their role. If so, it is natural to go one step further and conclude that the considerations that speak in favor of some F-ing, the considerations that close our deliberations, the considerations that we call reasons, are appropriate answers to some relevant normative questions. Furthermore, they are appropriate insofar as they contribute to closing the relevant question for us.

I take that something close enough to this line of thought implicit in the insightful proposal from Pamela Hieronymi when she claimed that “we would do better to think of a reason as *a consideration that bears on a question*” (Hieronymi (2005, 438) and “I find the idea of answering a question more intuitive for capturing the activities of rational agents” (Hieronymi (2005, 444, fn 16). However, despite being a major source of inspiration for the Erotetic view, Hieronymi’s remarks are also somewhat incomplete. In particular, she does not mention that questions seem

to involve ambiguity and that the relevant normative questions we seek to close may have several readings. The normative questions that reasons close and constitute answers to may have several readings. In general, some questions have several readings.

At this point, the first thing to note is that the relevant questions we seek to close in our deliberations are at the fundamental level of the why-F form. Here is one quick explanation of why. On a standard account of the semantics of questions (Hamblin 1973), a question's meaning is a set of propositions that contains a complete answer to the relevant question. In short, it is a partition of all the possibilities included in the question. For instance, the question 'What to eat tonight?' relativized to me and to a specific time and space has a meaning of all the possible options for me. So, for instance, it contains propositions like 'I eat soup tonight,' 'I eat salad tonight,' 'I eat cabbage tonight,' and so on. Of course, one of these can be picked out as the answer. But merely picking out one of the options is not enough for one to successfully close the deliberation. Suppose an oracle informs me that I will eat soup tonight. Do I have an appropriate way to close my deliberation about what to eat tonight? Not sure. It would seem that I need something more to close the deliberation successfully in a rational way. I lack an appropriate answer to the question, 'Why eat soup?' (rather than salad or cabbages).¹¹ Only a consideration that speaks to the why-F question can be accepted as an appropriate answer that I seek to close in a rational deliberation. A reason to F can be seen as an appropriate answer to the why-F question. A reason to eat soup tonight is a consideration that can successfully answer the 'Why eat soup?' question.

An intriguing complication at this stage is that why-questions, in general, can have several readings. In particular, it would seem that why-questions might require either an element to convince us of the truth of the answer or an element that could explain why exactly the true answer holds. Here is an example that illustrates this general ambiguity in why questions. Consider that you hear a friend of yours asserting that another

friend turns out to be a spy for a hostile regime. Upon hearing this, you ask, “Why is our friend a spy?”. Your friend might interpret your utterance in two ways, it seems. She can interpret it as a request for more information, that is, information that would effectively establish or prove to you that your other friend is a spy. She might interpret your question in this way precisely when she knows that the claim is surprising and that you didn’t ever suspect that the other friend is a spy. Maybe you asked the question in such a tone that she understood that you were stunned; indeed, you didn’t yet believe this. She goes on to provide you with proofs and arguments that establish that the friend is a spy. Say, the police found secret documents he recognized and now collaborates with the police and so on. However, she might also think that by asking the “Why is our friend a spy?” question, you ask her to give you some more fundamental explanation. Suppose this is the interpretation she makes of your question. In that case, she will probably go on to explain your friend’s actions by indicating that the hostile regime paid a lot of money for his services, or that your friend was a secret follower of the ideology of the secret regime or something along these lines. In short, she will try to explain your friend’s motives, not the evidence that incriminates him. It would seem that why-questions, in general, can have these two readings: the reading that asks for proofs, evidence, or arguments that would establish the truth of a claim for us and a reading that asks for an explanation that would make us better understand a given truth.

My proposal (Logins 2022) considers this general ambiguity of why-questions. Given the general ambiguity of why-questions, I specify the Erotetic account of reasons in a way that respects the possibility of two readings of normative why-F questions. (Note that denying the ambiguity of normative why-F questions while accepting the general ambiguity of why-questions calls for an extra explanation and error theory). In taking into account the ambiguity of why-F questions, (Logins 2022) proposes the following more elaborated functionalist dualist specification of the definition of reasons (Definition 2):

The Erotetic View of Reasons (explicit): For that p to be a reason to F for S is for that p to be either (a) (a part of) the content of an appropriate explanation providing (pattern of an) answer to a (S directed) question ‘Why F ?/Why ought S to F ?’ in its explanation requiring reading; or (b) the content of an appropriate premise in a good argument/reasoning providing (pattern of an) answer to a (S directed) question ‘Why F ?/Why ought S to F ?’ in its argument/reasoning requiring reading. (Logins 2022, 170)

The Erotetic definition of reasons is functional. And the function of reasons is tied to their role in responding to normative why questions. Normative why questions, like any why questions, are ambiguous and can have two readings. Accordingly, responses to normative why questions come in two sorts: normative reasoning reasons and normative explanatory reasons. Normative reasoning reasons are considerations that provide evidence or arguments that establish a truth for us, namely, that one should/ought F (or that it would be good that one F s). Normative explanatory reasons are considerations that provide elements of explanation that help us better understand why it is true that one should/ought F (or that it would be good that one F s).

The overall argument that I provide (Logins 2022) in favor of the Erotetic view, particularly in favor of its more elaborate version (Definition 2), is a cumulative inference to the best explanation. In the chapters preceding the presentation of the erotetic view, I provide an overview of all of the most popular existing accounts of normative reasons. I overview arguments in favor of these accounts and considers objections. In particular, (Logins 2022) classifies all the plausible views of reasons into two groups: Reasoning views and Explanation views. Reasoning views propose functionalist accounts of reasons by appealing to the role of reasons as premises in sound arguments/patterns of reasoning.

Meanwhile, explanation views focus on the function of reasons in explaining oughts or values. I show how each of these families of views seems to get something right while being nonetheless vulnerable to serious objections. The upshot is that the dualist functionalist erotetic view of

reasons is our best shot at defining reasons. It integrates what is plausible in both the Reasoning and Explanation approaches while avoiding their pitfalls. The overarching argument in favor of the Erotetic view in (Logins 2022) is thus an inference to the best explanation – the Erotetic view is the best explanation of the data we have, where the data are considerations that seem to speak in favor of the Reasoning approach and the considerations that seem to speak in favor of the Explanation approach. Given that the alternatives (the Reasoning view and the Explanation view) cannot explain the data as well as the Erotetic view does, we are warranted to conclude that the Erotetic view is the right approach. It is not supposed to establish the Erotetic view as certain. The overarching argument is not deductive. Yet, it seems to provide good theoretical support in favor of the Erotetic view.

Two last points must be noted before we can move to Rotkale's objections to the Erotetic view. First, note that another alternative to the Erotetic view, and any functionalist account that reduces normative reasons to their putative roles, is the so-called Reasons-first approach (cf. Scanlon 1998; Schroeder 2007; 2021; Parfit 2011). On the Reasons-first approach, we should not define normative reasons. The best we can do is to paraphrase "normative reasons" as "considerations that speak in favor of some F-ing." According to this picture, reasons are fundamental and prime in terms of explanation in the normative domain. We can appeal to reasons, according to Reasons-first, in order to define the oughts, permissions, values, good, bad, rationality and so on. Reasons-first is a popular approach in contemporary philosophy. However, its popularity seems to be diminishing somewhat. Indeed, an increasing number of philosophers seem to be attracted to reductionist views that want to say something more about reasons apart from the mere paraphrase that they are considerations that speak in favor of some F-ing. An extra motivation here comes from an observation that reasons seem to exhibit specific theoretic roles connected to sound reasoning or explanation.

Moreover, an increasing number of philosophers appear to be convinced that the so-called *wrong kind of reasons* problem is an insurmountable obstacle to accepting the reasons-first approach. In a nutshell, the wrong kind of reasons problem amounts to the conclusion that it is not possible at the same time to plausibly maintain that reasons can be used as prime elements in defining other normative properties or statuses (e.g., the good, the admirable) and explain without giving up their fundamentality (that is, without giving a further definition of reasons). The problem is often illustrated in the literature by cases where some consideration seems to speak in favor of some F, say, an attitude of admiration, where it is assumed that the attitude of admiration is the fitting response to have concerning someone admirable and where the admirable is defined as that which it is fitting to admire, where reasons are the fundamental explanation of why someone is admirable (one has sufficient reasons to admire the person). These cases typically involve a situation where one has a wrong kind of reason to admire someone, say, what receives a threat that things will go bad if one doesn't admire the person. The threat seems to be a genuine reason to admire; intuitively, it can be paraphrased that the threat is a consideration that speaks in favor of admiration. And yet, we certainly don't want to say that the person is admirable and reduce the admirability to having sufficient reasons to admire in this case. These sorts of cases show that it seems impossible for reasons-firsters to maintain the two desired assumptions – that normative reasons cannot be further specified by appeal to additional concepts and, at the same time, that normative reasons can be used to define all normative properties, including values. (Logins 2022) doesn't pretend that the debate concerning the wrong kind of reasons is completed. Yet, following other authors (cf. Hiernonymi 2005), I suggest that we have enough theoretical motivation to put the reasons-first approach aside and rather explore the reductive accounts. And as it happens, the reductive accounts are all accounts that focus on functions of reasons. In short, if one thinks that the reasons-first approach is the relevant alternative that is more plausible than the

Erotetic account, one still needs to show how the wrong kind of reason problem can be dealt with. Without that, the relevant alternatives to the erotetic view are other functionalist reductionist accounts (e.g., the Reasoning view and the Explanation view). And among these, the Erotetic view appears to be the most plausible.

This leads us to the last point of clarification. Given the above dialectic, any proposal to reject the Erotetic view faces the problem of explaining what we should accept instead of it. Given that it seemed more plausible than its alternatives, rejecting the Erotetic view requires either providing a plausible error theory for one of the discussed alternatives or a new alternative that doesn't face devastating objections. In short, what do we put in place if we reject the Erotetic view? One could, of course, always respond by suggesting that we need not propose any account of reasons since the very concept of reasons is incoherent and cannot be given a theory. Such a nihilistic pessimism, however, should be only an option of the last resort. Only when we have exhausted all the other theoretical options should we consider labeling a notion massively used in philosophical theorizing as incoherent. The fruitfulness of philosophical insights that we have gained in recent years, thanks to theorizing by appeal to reasons, should be taken seriously. The idea that there can be a theory or a coherent view of reasons should be our guide until insurmountable difficulties are met. And as it appears, the difficulties that some accounts of reasons (e.g., the Erotetic view) face are not insurmountable.

3. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

In a recent and thought-provoking publication in this journal, Rotkale challenges the Erotetic view by questioning the central distinction between normative reasoning reasons and normative explanatory reasons. Rotkale suggests that the purported distinction between normative reasoning and normative explanatory reasons is not robust. According to Rotkale,

(Logins 2022) does not convincingly establish the existence of two distinct sorts of normative reasons. Rotkale’s claim poses a challenge to the Erotetic view. Indeed, suppose we accept Rotkale’s conclusion and draw further inferences from it. In that case, we seem to be rationally permitted to conclude that (a version of) the Erotetic view cannot be correct. If we go on and infer that there are no two distinct sorts of normative reasons, we can conclude that the complete version of the Erotetic view (Definition 2) is incorrect.

Rotkale’s central argument in favor of the conclusion that the distinction between normative reasoning and normative explanatory reasons is not robust seems to take the form of a general dilemma involving the extensional and intensional readings of the distinction between the two sorts of reasons. More concretely, the dilemma seems to be the following one. A proponent of the Erotetic view of reasons must choose how they understand the two readings of normative reasons. Either these two readings are extensional. Or they are intensional (or even hyperintensional). Suppose the proponent of the Erotetic view of reasons goes with the extensional interpretation of the distinction. In that case, they are committed to the view that the meaning of sentences like ‘x is a reason for S to F’ is determined purely by appeal to extensions of the relevant terms (say, in a standard compositional truth-conditional way). However, suppose the Erotetic theorist takes this horn of the dilemma. In that case, they have then to explain how it is possible that the same facts (extensions) can be both normative reasoning and normative explanatory reasons. This is something that the Erotetic theory has to admit (and Logins 2022 accepts that the same facts/propositions can be normative reasoning reasons in one context and normative explanatory reasons in another context). This does not seem to be a possible task to complete since, by definition, extensional meaning just appeals to extensions and cannot help itself with an appeal to gadgets like contexts and so on. However, on the other hand, if a proponent of the Erotetic view endorses the distinction’s intensional (or hyperintensional) reading, they can say that the same facts

can be distinct reasons in different contexts (possible worlds). However, in this case, the proponent of the Erotetic approach (i) first owes us an explanation of how exactly the intensional/hyperintensional reading works, and (ii) second has to establish that the distinction between sorts of reasons is robust. Most of the discussion in Rotkale’s recent publication focuses on (ii), where Rotkale revisits some of the examples from (Logins 2022) that were supposed to illustrate the distinction and challenges the conclusion that they do illustrate the distinction. If it can be shown that all the proposed cases are indeed cases where we don’t seem to have any robust difference, we can conclude that the distinction between the two readings collapses. If so, the intensional reading of the distinction doesn’t warrant distinguishing two sorts of reasons. If so, either way, the distinction between normative reasoning and normative explanatory reasons is not established, according to the present interpretation of Rotkale’s argument.

In the remainder of the present article, I propose two quick and non-substantial responses ~~to Rotkale’s objection~~, one quick and substantial and one elaborate and substantial response.

The first quick, non-substantial, or easy response to Rotkale’s objection can be called the “beyond my pay grade” response. In short, it is to insist that the problem that Rotkale presents, by introducing the dilemma about intensional and extensional interpretations of the distinction between the two readings of ‘reasons’, is a problem for philosophers of language and that it is orthogonal to the discussion about reasons. The Erotetic theory of reasons is a theory of reasons, not a theory of the linguistic expression ‘reason’. Ontologically speaking, the Erotetic theory of reasons fits well with the idea that normative reasons are functions. And presumably, normative reasons are functions that take as inputs facts or propositions and give an abstract object as an output, namely, an appropriate answer to a normative question. But even this commitment to abstract objects can be understood in a lightweight manner. Perhaps it can be reduced to some social or natural phenomena at the end of the

day. The Erotetic view of reasons stays neutral on that. Now, how exactly the meaning of expressions involving reasons is to be understood is not something that the Erotetic view of reasons has to take a stance on. Maybe there is, after all, a way to defend an extensional approach by distinguishing two functions: the function that takes some facts and gives answers to the explanation requiring why-F questions and the function that takes some facts as inputs and gives as outputs answers to the argument /reasoning requiring why-F questions. One could insist that the meaning of ‘reason’ then is either one or the other of the sets of pairs corresponding to these two functions (where the pairs are of facts and answers). That some pairs in these two sets contain the same facts doesn’t establish that the sets are identical. Compare it to a possible treatment of the predicate ‘father’. The predicate is ambiguous; it can have (at least) two readings – the biological father reading and the religious father reading (to refer to catholic priests). The fact that some individuals are in both, the set that gives the meaning for the ‘biological father’ interpretation of ‘father’ and the set that gives the meaning for the ‘catholic priest’ interpretation of father, doesn’t necessarily create a problem for an extensional approach to the meaning of the term ‘father.’ At least, it seems that this is an orthogonal discussion, and a proponent of the Erotetic view might be allowed to not take a stance on whether we should endorse the extensional or intensional approach to meaning.

My second quick and non-(very)-substantial response is to simply note that even if Rotkale’s objections are on the right track, the core Erotetic view is untouched by them. Even if Rotkale is right and there is no robust distinction between normative and explanatory reasons, this still doesn’t show that the Erotetic view of reasons, as specified in Definition 1, is wrong. Normative reasons might still be appropriate answers to the normative why questions, even if these answers come only in one sort. That is, the core Erotetic thesis would still be true even if it turned out that there is no substantial distinction between normative reasoning reasons and normative explanatory reasons.

A more substantial but still quick response that a proponent of the Erotetic view of reasons can provide is to insist that if we reject the Erotetic view, we have to point towards a plausible alternative. However, as we saw above, neither alternative functionalist reductionist views of reasons, the reasons-first alternative, nor the nihilist stance about reasons don't seem to be particularly attractive alternatives. At any rate, if we reject the Erotetic view of reasons based on worries that normative reasoning reasons and normative explanatory reasons collapse, then we need a theoretical argument to show that this specific problem is much worse than problems that the above-listed alternatives face. In short, at this debate stage, it seems inevitable that any take on reasons will have some advantages but will face several objections, too. It is then inevitable that whatever solution we endorse in this debate, we will have to accept a theoretical tradeoff, where we accept some of the disadvantages of a view but think that overall, the advantages of the given view outweigh the disadvantages (that is, the force of objections is not so strong as to warrant the rejection, given the worries with available alternatives). The philosophical work at this stage is to compare the available tradeoffs. My suggestion here is that the tradeoff that we get in the case of the Erotetic view of reasons is not worse than the tradeoffs we get in alternative options. Indeed, I think that even if Rotkale were right and there is no fundamental distinction between normative reasoning and normative explanatory reasons, and that those who share the intuitions about cases where the two seem to come apart were, for some reason, wrong, the Erotetic view of reasons is still our best option we have. Note also that rejecting the Erotetic view because there is no substantial distinction between the two sorts of reasons requires one to provide a plausible error theory of why many seem to share the judgments about the relevant cases as illustrating the distinction. Thus, given that no more plausible alternative story about reasons is yet available, we might still have to stick with the Erotetic view of reasons, even though not everyone shares the judgments about the cases where the distinction between normative reasoning and normative explanatory reasons seems to be illustrated.

Finally, a more substantial and elaborate answer takes up the task of responding more attentively to the intriguing extensional/intensional interpretation challenge. In the remainder, I provide a general structure of the response and some comments on some cases revisited in Rotkale's article.

Here is the general structure of the answer to the challenge. Some facts can play the role of a premise in a good pattern of reasoning towards a conclusion C and an element of explanation of C. Consider the fact that it was raining today. Consider the conclusion that the floor is wet now. Consider the sequence: it was raining today, and the floor is wet now. We can imagine that this sequence is the content of a train of thought. It seems perfectly possible that the same content of a train of thought can be present in two possible worlds, and yet the epistemic import of this train of thought can be distinct in the two possible worlds. Consider world 1, where at t1, subject S doesn't know that the floor is wet. She learned at t1 that it was raining today. Furthermore, she has some background information about a leak in the roof of the house and that the floor has gotten wet whenever it rains. At t2, S infers that the floor is wet, based on her learning that it was raining and the background information. Consider world 2, where everything is as in world 1, except that S knows already at t1 that the floor is wet. She infers at t2 that the floor is wet on the basis that it was raining today and the background information about the roof. It is natural to see a cognitive or epistemic difference in the two worlds that goes beyond any difference in the content of the relevant sequence <it was raining, the floor is wet>. The propositional content of the sequence is the same. And yet, the sequence doesn't seem to mean the same in the two worlds. Where in world 1, S gains knowledge of the second element of the sequence on the basis of the first, in world 2, S gains understanding of the first element of the sequence on the basis of the second. If this is on the right track, we seem to have the beginning of an intensional interpretation of the distinction between normative reasoning and explanatory reasons here. The distinction in the meaning

of the sequence can then be easily translated into a difference in the content of reasons. We might say, for instance, that the facts (that it was raining) are both reasons, but since there is a functional difference in the sequence in different worlds, the function that the rain fact plays is not the same in both worlds. In world 1, it plays a role in a good pattern of reasoning, whereas in world 2, it plays an explanatory role. This was the general structure of the more attentive response to the intensional/extensional interpretation challenge. I will now turn to consider some of the relevant cases.

Concerning the soup example on pages 172-173 in Logins (2022) Rotkale seems to suggest that one of the problems with My reading of the example is that (only) when the main emphasis is on the word soup, the healthiness of the soup aspect becomes important. To this, I would like to respond that (Logins 2022) here merely assumes the fact that the soup was bought as sufficient to explain why it should be eaten today. It has nothing to do with healthiness. I see the point is just that that I chose soup could be a premise, too, in special circumstances.

With respect to the Moore-paradoxical cases (where ‘that the building is on fire and I don’t know that the building is on fire’ could be one’s reason to F), we might think that the author insists that it might be possible to hold conflicting beliefs at the same time. However, the Moore-paradoxical sentence in the original case is not just about fire. It is “There is a fire in the building, but I don’t know that there is a fire in the building.” If we transpose the case to the case of a mere belief (and not knowledge), we get “there is a fire (p), and I don’t believe that there is a fire (not-Bp).” It would seem the problem is not about entertaining conflicting beliefs p and not p. Even transposed to the case of mere belief, the situation is still paradoxical - asserting that p undermines the appropriateness of assertion that one doesn’t believe that p. And asserting that one doesn’t believe that p undermines the appropriateness of asserting that p. Or so it would seem. If so, then a pattern of reasoning where one reason in the following way: “There is a fire in the building, and I don’t believe there is a fire in the building, so let’s check whether there is a fire in the building,”

appears somewhat absurd. The author seems to suggest that sometimes it can be appropriate to reason from contradiction by *assuming* that p and that not p. But reasoning from a contradiction is a different case. In the fire case, the relevant attitudes are not mere assumptions but the *belief* that p and *disbelief* that p (the lack of belief that p). Reasoning with contradictory assumptions (assuming that p and assuming that not p) might be acceptable; clearly, reasoning with contradictory beliefs (believing that p and believing that not p) is not.

Note also that mentioning ignorance in the relevant explanation of why one ought to check whether the building is on fire in this case is essential. There doesn't seem to be a redundancy in mentioning ignorance in *this* explanation. It would seem that this is precisely how the explanation works. That I don't know and that the building is on fire is what explains why I ought to check. Of course, it might be that I don't know that I ought to check. This doesn't mean that there is no explanation of why I ought to check. Compare our situation to a case where this liquid is water, and the stove is not hot enough, which explains why the water is not boiling. The liquid is water, and the stove, air, etc., are not hot enough, so the liquid doesn't boil. But why this couldn't be an explanation? It seems that it is a legitimate explanation.

Finally, the author seems to think that in the case of the pragmatist-evidentialist debate, we should not accept the pragmatist proposal. In particular, the author seems to suggest that the fact that belief in God makes one happy cannot explain why one should believe in God. At this point, I would merely note that pragmatists will respond that it clearly can be the case that the fact that a belief makes one happy could explain why one should have that belief. If so, we then just end up with a clash of intuitions. How should we decide who is right and who is wrong in this dispute? At any rate, we need arguments beyond our intuitive judgments. The advantage of the Erotetic view of reasons is that it doesn't entail rejecting altogether pragmatist intuitions or evidentialist ones. It provides an argument for the conclusion that both are, in a sense, right and wrong.

By appealing to two sorts of normative reasons, a proponent of the Erotetic view of reasons can allow that there is a sense in which there can be pragmatic reasons to believe, but there is also a sense in which there cannot be such reasons.

4. CONCLUSION

In this article, I have examined a recent insightful critique of the Erotetic view of reasons published in this journal in Rotkale. I overviewed a version of the Erotetic view and provided several ways of responding to the critique. Some of the possible responses were more substantial than others. My final verdict is that we can still stick at least to the claim that normative reasons are answers to normative questions, and we still appear to be warranted in thinking that normative reasons come in two sorts: normative reasoning reasons and normative explanatory reasons.

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NOTE

- 1 Compare this to the contrastivism about normative reasons, cf. Snedegar 2017