I am a Swiss National Science Foundation Ambizione Fellow at the University of Zürich. Previously, I was a postdoc at the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences and Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva (see here for more). Still, before that, I was a visiting postdoc at the University of Southern California. I specialize in epistemology and in foundational normative questions, but I am also interested in philosophy of language. I have focused my research on three main questions: What are normative reasons in general? How do we think about graded notions in epistemology? What are the consequences within and outside epistemology of taking knowledge as fundamental and explanatorily prime? These general research questions correspond to my three main research programs. See my research statement for more on these.
I am also a member of ZEGRA (Zurich Epistemology Group on Rationality).
- A Theory of Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation, under contract with Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy series)
- How to Argue with a Pragmatist, Inquiry, (forthcming), penultimate version (PDF);
- (with John Hawthorne). Graded Epistemic Justification, Philosophical Studies, (forthcoming); doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01512-0; penultimate version (PDF);
- Is an increase in probability always an increase in evidential support? Erkenntnis, (forthcoming); penultimate version (PDF).
- Two-State Solution to the Lottery Paradox, Philosophical Studies, (2019); penultimate version (PDF), link to publication.
- Normative Reasons Without (Good) Reasoning, Ethics, 130:2, (2020): 208-210; doi: 10.1086/705765.
- Subjective Unpossessed Reasons, Thought, 7:4, (2018): 262-270, 2018, doi:10.1002/tht3.395; PDF; link to publication.
- Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K. Theoria, 83:2, (2017): 120–137; doi:10.1111/theo.12111; PDF; link to publication.
- Save the children! Analysis 76:4, (2016): 418-422; doi:10.1093/analys/anw051; PDF; link to publication.
- The problem of massive deception for justification norms of action. Acta Analytica, 29:4, (2014): 457-468; doi: 10.1007/s12136-014-0220-1; PDF; link to publication.
- (Book Review) Review of M.McBride, Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge, dialectica, 73:1, (2020): 280-285.
- (General Audience) Why won’t scientific evidence change the minds of Loch Ness monster true believers?, The Conversation, June 6, 2018;